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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The relationship between military spending and human rights is one of the most 
prominent issues in political economy. Yet, the linkage between the two is empirically 
underdeveloped. Seeking to fulfill this existing gap in the literature, we examine the 
effects of militarization on human rights performance in six South Asian economies for 
the period 1980 – 2006.  Our findings demonstrate that an increase in military spending 
significantly reduces human rights. Acceleration of military spending is also associated 
with decline in human rights performance. By gauging the effect of military spending on 
human rights conditions during war and peace years, we found that irrespective of war or 
peace years, any increase in military spending is detrimental to human rights conditions. 
Further, we find that the negative impact of military spending on human rights is 
conditioned by increase in their neighbors’ spending.  
 
Given the wide range of socioeconomic and political problems ailing South Asian 
countries, these results gain significant importance. The study suggests that reduction in 
military spending could help reallocate the resources to productive purposes, thereby 
paving way for development and progress. This help reducing social unrest and economic 
insecurity, thereby increases government’s respect for human rights. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been considerable amount of scholarly attention given to area of militarization 
and security in the past. Studies have paid special attention to militarization and its affect 
on economic growth, socioeconomic development, deterrence, initiation, conduct and the 
termination of war. However, the impact of militarization on human rights performance 
has received little attention in the literature. This study is an attempt to fulfil this gap in 
the literature. Basically, there are two reasons for a state engaging in militarization. The 
perceived nature of relations among states being the foremost reason; arms are widely 
viewed as an instrument of defense from external threat.  The international system is said 
to be anarchic by the realist doctrine. Conflicts among states stem from international 
anarchy, as states are not subjugated to a higher authority. It is the dynamics of 
international anarchy – constant insecurity, self-help, and power struggle - that give rise 
to wars among states (Waltz 1959: 237). States try to protect themselves through the 
build up of military capabilities (Morgenthau 1965: 5). It’s the understanding that 
coercive military response is required for the state to be preserved. Hence, the collection 
of arms guarantees the security of states in the anarchic international system. According 
to this logic, increased militarization affords states increased security. Therefore, states 
have a strong incentive to build up their militaries. In the present context the incentive for 
a state to militarize due to external threats is especially pronounced in the developed 
world.  
 
In the developing world, however, internal threats to the state are far more common. 
Thus, the second reason for the militarization of a state could be identified as the 
domestic security situation. The internal security in many South Asian states is unstable. 
Domestic instability is a clear incentive to militarize. Unstable domestic situations lead to 
a high level of militarization is exemplified by the case of Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, the 
Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE hereafter) are currently waging guerilla warfare 
against the Sri Lankan government. The Sri Lankan government has poured US$1.5 
billion in recent years to its military complex to crush the rebel movement. Sri Lanka 
stands to be the most militarized state in South Asia (Bhatt Semu & Mistry Devika 2006: 
12). In Pakistan, militarization has increased due to its alliance with the United States and 
its infighting against al-Qaeda and Taliban forces on the domestic front. In Burma, the 
military junta has poured large percentage of its resources to the military to control the 
revolt for democracy against the activists. Internal disturbances and rise of extreme 
fundamentalist forces resorting to terror activities forced Bangladesh to beef up its 
military spending. Since 1996, Nepal has countered the insurgency of Maoists, the 
defence spending increased drastically.  
 
The South Asian states have also extensively used its military against their own 
population during the times of unrest. Studies have shown that the relationship between 
government coercion and political violence depicts an inverted U shaped relationship. At 
lower levels of violence the dissent tends to grow while at higher levels dissent can be 
brought down (Moore 1998 cited by Gupta 2003: 24). Thus, the rational for using higher 
degree of violence against its own citizens could be validated from a view of political 
expediency. In this regard Lopez (1986) writes, “Governing styles that employ official   3
violence and terror by ruling elites against segments of their own populations have 
become all too common place contemporary affair”. Stohl (211: 1986) argues that states 
would engage in state terrorism both when it perceives itself to be in a powerless 
situation when all other means have been exhausted and when the state is in a position of 
strength. Gurr (63: 1986) concludes that a state would engage in violence for eight direct 
reasons viz., external threat, proxy big wars, weakly institutionalized regimes, elite access 
to and maintain power, political threat by challenges, democratic political cultural 
institutions, social heterogeneity and peripheral international status.  
 
Studies in literature also point to a higher level of political repression in countries that 
spend greater levels on its military (Park 1987; Davenport 1995). However, when 
comparing states that have military governments to states that have civilian governments, 
Mc Kinlay & Kohan (1975) suggest that military governments are more inclined to 
violate human rights than civilian governments. This finding is of special significance for 
this study since some South Asian states, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, have 
oscillated between military and civilian rule. Burma’s military rule has been absent of 
any democratic institutions, while democratic countries such as India and Sri Lanka have 
experienced very high levels of human rights abuses. 
 
Thus, it would be interesting to explore the relationship between militarization and 
human rights performance in South Asian countries. We examined six South Asian 
countries for this study for the period of 1980 – 2006. In the process we also examine the 
impact of military spending on human rights performance during war and peace years. 
Additionally, we examine whether the negative (positive) impact of military spending on 
human rights performance is conditioned by the level of military spending of their 
neighbours. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 uncovers the 
discussion on the direct and indirect effects of military sector growth on human rights 
performance. The research design and modelling militarization and human rights 
performance is explained in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, While 
Section 5 concludes the study.  
 
2. Militarization & Human Rights – The Interrelationship 
 
a. Direct Effects 
 
The relationship between militarization and human rights can be captured under direct 
effects and indirect effects. The direct effects of militarization can broadly be classified in 
to two factors. Firstly, product of arms races between states that lead to conflict. 
Secondly, the internal state conflicts, political violence and / or civil war within the state. 
The study on developing countries by Blandon (1996); support the above arguments she 
finds that the import of arms contributed to making violent political acts more feasible. 
Infact, Lewis Fry Richardson’s seminal work in the 1960’s applicable for countries, such 
as India and Pakistan, where increasing military expenditure in one country leads to 
increased militarization in another. The cyclical militarization, as a consequence of the 
security dilemma, might lead to an outbreak of conflict. The 1999 Kargil war between 
India and Pakistan could be analyzed from a Realpolitik lens as being the product of high   4
levels of the cyclical militarization. It is evident that the fighting of wars between states is 
detrimental to human rights performance (Dreher, Gassebner & Siemers, 2007).  
 
The second direct effect of militarization on human rights abuse is due to the internal 
threats within the state. These threats can be real or simply preconceived by the 
government. Thus, whenever the government is faced with such internal threats, it would 
resort to the means of repression though exercising its military capacity (Stohl, 1975; 
Rasler, 1976; Tilly, 1978; Lopez, 1986; Gurr, 1986; Mason & Krane, 1989; King, 1999; 
Muller & Weede, 1990; Gartner & Regan, 1996; Franklin, 1997; Loveman & Davies 
1997; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999; Mahoney-Norris, 2000; Poe, Tate & Lanier, 2000; Lee, 
2001; and Kaufman, 2001). Types of threats include: violent demonstrations, riots, 
political violence, civil war, ethnic war and conflicts between regions within the country. 
To control the internal state disorder, governments sometimes engage in the act of 
repressing the (take out “the”) human rights to bring the situation under control (Mitchell 
& McCormick, 1988; Blanton, 1999; Apodaca, 2001 and Blanton & Blanton, 2004). 
There are ample examples in South Asian countries where the military was used to 
contain the internal threat situations that have led to massive human rights violations. 
Some of the most prominent examples include: the case of Jammu & Kashmir and North 
Eastern States in India, Baluchistan, and Waziristan provinces in Pakistan in the recent 
years, the famous Chittagong hills entanglement in Bangladesh in late 1980s and early 
1990s, LTTE rebels in North-Eastern parts of Sri Lanka, Maoists insurgents in the forests 
of Nepal and anti-autocracy movements in Burma. Thus, we believe that the 
government’s respect towards human rights is lower when it is faced with internal threats, 
especially in the form of violent conflicts.  
 
b. Indirect Effects 
 
The indirect effects of militarization on human rights performance can be better 
explained through Figure 1. This is a result of an effort to put in perspective in a model 
form as to how military spending can influence human rights performance as an indirect 
cost of lower development and progress. Higher defense spending and the opportunity 
cost foregone towards spending on development purposes lead to poor socioeconomic 
conditions. Figure 1 illustrates how military sector growth can affect the socioeconomic 
development in an economy at the expense of diminishing returns to social development 
sectors. As larger proportions of a country’s productive resources are diverted towards 
funding the military sector growth, its impact in the long run on development expenditure 
is expected to be negative. As defense spending increases rapidly, the total government 
expenditure increases at a faster rate. However, this rapid increase in military spending 
has a cost associated with it. Because, to fund this ever increasing defense spending, the 
government would be forced
1 to cut its expenditure on other sectors (most prominently 
                                                 
1 Sometimes in Democracies where there is coalition governments face the dilemma of whether to cut the 
development or non developmental spending.  Most of the times, the government would not be in a 
favorable position to cut the non development spending due to political compulsions. This leaves the 
government with no other option but to go for a cut in development spending. Also given the fact that this 
is the era of globalization, where we see decline in rate of both direct and indirect taxes on the name of 
reforms, it becomes even harder for the government to mop up the additional resources to fund the military   5
related to development). As defense spending growth increases beyond a point (P2) the 
development spending will start declining at a much faster rate.  
 
Figure – 1: Opportunity Cost Burden Effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This means that the cost of the next best alternative use (opportunity cost) is forgone by 
the country as it diverts development expenditure towards funding the military sector 
growth requirements. Thus, we see two curves, one taking the form of convex which is 
the total military expenditure and the other taking the form of concave, development 
spending. Meaning, the net effect on overall socioeconomic development may be 
positive, if the defense burden is smaller. This would yield benefits in the form of higher 
human and social development thereby leading to decline in poor socioeconomic 
conditions. On the contrary, as more of a country’s resources are diverted towards 
military sector growth, the net positive influence on development would decline, which is 
detrimental to overall progress and development of the poor. 
 
The fundamental responsibility of any government for its people is to provide basic 
public goods and services. The basic public services include providing education, 
healthcare facilities, drinking water, sanitation and food which are major constituents of 
development spending. Van de Walle & Nead (1995) discovered that basic health and 
education services almost universally yield benefits for the poor. However, failing to 
provide these services adequately means is a failure of the government. The failure to do 
                                                                                                                                                 
expenditure. This directly puts the pressure of the governments to cut development spending in order to 
continue supplying resources for the growth of military sector. 
Size of military sector growth 
Growth of development 
spending 
Direct cost of growing 
military sector 
Opportunity cost of military 
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so leads to economic and social dissatisfaction amongst the poor and middle class in the 
society. This paves way for economic insecurity and social unrest risking political 
stability and outbreak of conflicts thereby (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Barbieri, 1996; 
Rodrik, 1997, Rodrik, 1998; Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000, Blinder, 2006; Summers, 2006; 
Krugman, 2007). This scenario is detrimental to human rights conditions.  
 
3. Modeling “Human rights performance & Military Sector growth”  
 
3. 1. Dependent Variables 
 
In order to investigate the impact of military sector growth on human rights performance, 
it is necessary for us to define what we considered by human rights performance in the 
present context. In essence it includes: “integrity of people”, “empowerment rights of 
people” and “state terrorism”. We believe that there is a very strong and direct impact of 
military sector growth with respect to state terrorism than empowerment rights. In fact, 
the correlation between military sector spending and state terrorism indicators is -0.54 in 
comparison to +0.12 between military spending and empowerment rights indicators. 
Therefore, the scope of the study is restricted to state terrorism. To capture this broad 
aspect, we take into account two widely used indicators in literature dealing with state 
terrorism. These indicators are Physical Integrity Rights index and Political Terror Scale
2. 
Similar to Dreher, Gassebner & Siemers (2007) we use these two indices in our analysis. 
 
a. Physical Integrity Rights Index 
 
The Physical Integrity Rights index (PIR) eported in the human rights database (CIRI) 
contain information about the pattern and sequence of government respect for physical 
integrity rights in addition to the level. Here, the pattern is defined as “the association of 
different levels of government respect for several physical integrity rights with a single, 
overall scale score” (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). Sequence is defined as “the order in 
which governments have a propensity to violate particular physical integrity rights” 
(Cingranelli & Richards, 1999). The CIRI data are based on the human rights practices of 
governments and any of its agents, such as police or paramilitary forces. The CIRI 
measure is an additive index constructed from observations on torture, extrajudicial 
killing, political imprisonment, and disappearances. It ranges from 0, meaning no 
government respect for these four human rights to 8, or full government respect for these 
four human rights. The source of information used for coding these five variables was 
from the U.S. State Department's annual country reports on human rights practices.  
 
b. Political Terror Scale 
 
Our second measure of human rights abuses measures levels of political terrorism. We 
use data from the Political Terror Scales (PTS). The PTS data focus on the amount of 
respect a society gives to personal integrity rights, specifically the freedom from 
                                                 
2 See Carleton & Stohl (1987); Gibney & Dalton (1997); Poe & Meernik (1995); Poe & Tate (1994); Stohl 
et al. (1984); Cingranelli & Richards (1999); Richards (1998); Zanger (2000); Neumayer (2005); Dreher, 
Gassebner & Siemers (2007) and Eriksen & de Soysa (2008).   7
politically motivated imprisonment, torture and murder. This scale developed by Gibney 
(2004), who provides data from 1980 onwards and later extended it back from 1976
3. The 
PTS scores include two components. One is based on a codification of country 
information from Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports to a scale from 1 
(best) to 5 (worst)
4. The other scale is based on information from the U.S. Department of 
State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.  
 
The final codification is as follows: 
 
Score 1 : Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, 
and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 
 
Score 2 : There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. 
However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder 
is rare.  
 
Score 3 : There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such 
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. 
Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted. 
 
Score 4 : Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the 
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its 
generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. 
 
Score 5 : Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies 
place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or 
ideological goals. 
 
States are given the scores from 1 to 5; the other major contentious issue is which 
indicator amongst the two should be used. Before deciding upon the selection, it is worth 
highlighting the advantages and drawbacks of both these indicators. Poe et al. (2001) 
points out that the State Department data is biased. They argue that the US State 
Department reports lower values (1 – best) for the countries that are allies of US on 
international diplomatic front. This effectively means that the Amnesty International data 
is unbiased. However, Neumayer (2005) points out that although Amnesty International 
data is unbiased, it covers only a few countries in the early years, leaving out some 
countries with little or no human rights abuses. For more accurate results, we take the 
average score of both State Department and Amnesty International data.  
 
Thus, the effect of military sector growth on human rights abuses is studied using PIR 
index as dependent variable in the first equation function, while the second equation 
function considers PTS. Therefore, the two parsimonious models for military sector 
growth and Human rights abuses are specified as follows: 
 
                                                 
3 We thank Dr. Gibney for providing the data for all the three scores of PTS on request.  
4 The data can be found at http://www.unca.edu/~mgibney   8
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Where: i / t = country “i” at time “t”; δ / φ  = intercepts for the equations; ψ / Ω = 
regression coefficients for variable “n”; ε / γ = error terms for country “i” at time “t”. The 
description about the key independent variable, military sector growth, along with other 
control variables is discussed in the next section 3.1. This empirical analysis covers six 
South Asian economies (see annexure 5) for the period 1980 to 2006.  
 
We ran all the models twice, first using pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) and 
second using fixed effects methods. The first option was selected because some of the 
variables like democracy scores and ethnic fractionalization index are time invariant 
series. However, we also performed fixed effects method because of two reasons. One, 
the time invariant effects could be controlled by using country-fixed effects. Two, South 
Asian economies vary in size, political climate and the levels of military sector growth 
are different. These and other fixed or time varying  country attributes like: number of 
riots, number of political violent events, institutional setups etc., can be correlated with 
human rights conditions leading to omitted variable bias. Therefore consistent with Beck 
& Katz (1996) advice, fixed effects method is performed in suspicion that there are other 
factors than those captured in our explanatory variables affecting the human rights 
performance and hence country fixed effects method. However, the pooled time-series 
cross-sectional (TCSC) data may exhibit Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
problems. While these problems do not bias the estimated coefficients as pooled 
regression analysis in itself is a more robust method for large sample consisting of cross 
section and time series data. However, they often tend to cause biased standard errors for 
coefficients, producing invalid statistical inferences. To counter these problems, we 
estimated for all the models the Huber-White robust standard errors clustered over 
countries. These estimated standard errors are robust to both Heteroskedasticity and to a 
general type of serial correlation within the cross-section unit (Rogers, 1993 and 
Williams, 2000).  
 
 
 
Political Terror Scale = α1 + Ω2 Military Sector growth it + Ω3 Economic Growth Rate it +  
Ω4 log (Economic Development) it + Ω5 War years it + Ω6 Pace years it + Ω7 
Political Regime it + Ω8 log (Population)it + Ω9 Ethnic Fractionalization it + Ω10 
British Legal Heritage it  + Ω11 Socialist Legal Heritage it  + Ω12 Time it + γit   9
3. 2. Independent variables: ‘Hypothesis variable’ 
 
a. Military Sector Growth 
 
Quantifying military sector growth is a huge task and also subject to availability of the 
data on certain sensitive items. The best way perhaps would be to capture the military 
sector growth indicators separately, such as: military expenditure, armed forces growth 
rate, R&D spending on defense sector, arms possession and arms trade. The other 
possible way is to construct a unidirectional index of military sector growth which 
comprises of all these variables mentioned above. Though we would have liked to 
capture as many indicators as possible out the listed above, the absence of time series 
data on such items for South Asian countries prevented us to use the traditional set of 
indicator, the military spending as a proxy for military sector growth in these countries. 
Thus, our typical main independent variable is the total military expenditure measured in 
US$ millions, which is logged.  
 
3. 3. Control Variables 
 
Previous research on the violations of human rights has established several key factors 
that explain why governments violate human rights (McKilay & Cohan, 1975; Strouse & 
Claude, 1976; Park, 1987; Cingranelli, 1992; Poe & Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995, 1996, 
1997; King, 1999; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999; Carey & Poe, 2004 and Landman, 2006). 
Using their arguments, we divide these control variables into two subheads: institutional 
and economic variables. The variables under latter group include: economic growth, 
economic development and abundant natural resources. The variables selected under 
former head include: population pressures, democracy levels, civil war presence, civil 
peace years, ethnic fractionalization and British/Socialist legal heritage. 
 
The literature shows that there is a positive impact of development and equity on human 
rights (Mitchell & McCormick, 1988; Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Marks & Diamond, 1992; 
Davenport 1995; Blanton, 1999; Milner, 2000; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, 2001; 
Amartya Sen 1999; Kaufmann 2004; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi 2005; Blanton & 
Blanton, 2006; Eriksen & de Soysa, 2008; Vadlamannati & Tamazian, 2007 and 
Vadlamannati & de Soysa 2008). The models control the effects of development and 
growth by introducing logged value of per capita GDP in US$ PPP constant terms and 
the economic growth rate. The data for both these variables come from world 
development indicators of World Bank 2006.  
 
On institutional factors, literature shows that the level of democracy is a key variable 
associated with human rights. The democracy scores take shape as a discrete variable 
taking the value 1 if the polity IV, variable polity II, is greater than 6 on the 10-point 
scale and 0 if not (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995)
5. The studies show that democracy affects 
rights only at very high levels (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004). Thus, we take the polity 
IV scores to capture for democracy levels. Following other prominent studies in literature 
(Goldstone 1991; Henderson, 1993; Homer-Dixon et al. 1993; Poe & Tate, 1994; Howard 
                                                 
5 The data can be accessed from http://www.colorado.edu/ IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html.   10
& Homer-Dixon 1995; Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999; Blanton, 1999; Blanton & Blanton, 
2006; Eriksen & de Soysa 2008; Vadlamannati & Tamazian, 2007 and Vadlamannati & 
de Soysa 2008) we also take into account the log value of total population adapted from 
world development indicators of World Bank 2006. The countries with higher ethnic 
fractionalization often face the risk of ethnic wars. To capture this effect, we include the 
degree of ethnic fractionalization developed by Fearon & Laitin (2003). Prominent 
studies like Poe & Tate (1994); Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) and Dreher, Gassebner & 
Siemers (2007) argue that civil war and peace years are important determinants of human 
rights conditions. Thus, we include the dummy  variable 1 if civil war exists in the 
country and 0 otherwise. We also include number of peace years for each country from 
1993 to 2006. The peace years variable is included as the number of peace years since 
every last civil war occurred in a country. The data for both these variables come from 
the Uppsala database updated version of 2007. Several studies include a lagged 
dependent variable to control for autocorrelation (Poe & Tate, 1994 and Poe, Tate & 
Keith, 1999). A lagged dependent variable is also meant to control for regional diffusion 
and spill-over effects (Neumayer, 2005). There are two reasons for the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable (LDV). First, a methodological reason, that is to control for 
autocorrelation, endogenity, and omitted variables (Beck & Katz, 1996). Second, a 
theoretical reason, that holds that governments tend to use past decisions as a baseline for 
their present decisions (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999). Thus, we run both the models of PIR 
and PTS using with and without lagged dependent variables. 
 
4. Empirical results  
 
4. 1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis  
 
The sample of country-years that we examine in total made up of 162 observations. In 
annexure 1, we present the summary statistics for this sample for all the variables that we 
employ in the regression analysis. The mean value for PIR is just 2.35 per country-year 
with a small standard deviation of 1.90. The sample is also made up of another human 
rights indicator namely, PTS. The mean value of this is 3.7 with lower standard deviation 
compared to PRI, 0.90. In fact both these values suggest that during the sample period the 
human rights regime was poor and marked by greater number of abuses and violations. 
The median value of military spending is 664,454.5 US$, but the variance in reforms is 
very high, with a standard deviation of just 4,467,565 US$. This suggests suggesting that 
the military spending differs widely across these six countries under the study. With 
respect to GDP growth rate we can find that the median growth rate is 3.51%.  Moreover, 
the variance in GDP growth rates is fairly high, with a standard deviation of 4.61% and 
growth rates ranging from -12.92% to 12.51%. With respect to percapita GDP, the mean 
value is log 7.41% with a standard deviation of as high as 0.36%, highlighting that the 
development process do not vary significantly across these countries. Another indicator 
which is noteworthy is democracy scores which have very high standard deviation of 
6.32 with maximum value of 9 and minimum of -8. This highlights that at least in terms 
of political regime there is a significant cross country variation.  
 
In Annexure 2 we present the aggregate information about the military spending: arms 
imports & human rights conditions in South Asia. These values are averages at different   11
points of time. We classified the points of time from: 1980 – 1984; 1985 – 1994 and 1995 
– 2006. In the case of India, both military spending and arms import on an average 
increase from 1980-1984 to 1985-1994. During the same period there human rights 
performance (PIR score) decreased from 3.00 to 1.00. In the period 1995-2006 though 
average arms imports declined compared to previous period, the average military 
spending kept increasing. On the other hand, the human rights performance worsened 
further from 1.00 to 0.17. Overall, during the period 1980-2006, the average score of PIR 
was 1.00 which is higher human rights abuses. Similar such trends can be observed in the 
cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh as we see that increase in military spending is 
coincided with decline in human rights performance. The average human rights score for 
Pakistan during the whole study period was 2.31 and 3.12 for Bangladesh. The case is 
somewhat different for Sri Lanka as there was a massive increase in both average military 
spending and arms imports during 1985-1994 period due to intensifying of internal 
conflict with LTTE rebels. During the same period, Sri Lanka recoded one of the worst 
human rights performances ever with average PIR score of 0.70. For Burma and Nepal, 
we find that in all the three periods there is remarkable increase in average both military 
spending and arms imports. This is exactly coincided with significant drop in PIR index 
during the three periods. One thing which clearly emerges from this information 
presented in annexure 2 is that there is a very strong inverse relationship between average 
military spending and human rights performance. For all the countries we saw that there 
was remarkable increase in military spending which is coincided with drastic fall in PIR 
index values. Further, the negative correlation of -0.54 between the two confirms this 
inverse relationship.   
 
4. 2. Regression Estimates  
 
The results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of military spending on human 
rights performance viz., physical integrity rights and political terror scale in South Asian 
economies are presented in Table 1 and 2.  While Table 1 deals with models related to 
PIR, Table 2 focuses on PTS. Each table consists of 10 models each, measuring various 
permutations and combinations of military sector growth and human rights conditions. 
Every model is run using both pooled regression and fixed effects methods. Additionally, 
sensitivity analysis is carried out using the index of civil liberties of freedom house. We 
control for Heteroskedasticity using White Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
& covariance.  
 
In Model 1 (see Table 1) we find that military spending has 1% significant negative 
impact on basic human rights. The physical integrity scores are measured on a scale of 0 
to 9, zero represent worst human rights abuses and 9 highest represent respect for human 
rights. Therefore the negative effect of military spending suggests reduction in 
government respect for human rights. Every 1% increase in military spending leads to 
0.60% decrease in government respect for basic human rights. In other words, holding at 
its mean value, increase in military spending by its highest value (17.10) would decrease 
the respect for PIR by 0.60%.  12
Table 1: Human Rights Performance & Military Expenditure Equation Function 
 
Dependent Variable: Physical Integrity Rights Index 
 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
Model 9 
 
Model 10 
 
 
Regression Method 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS  
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS  
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS  
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS  
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Constant 
-2.87 
(4.96) 
-4.69 
(6.54) 
1.78 
(4.54) 
0.12 
(5.45) 
-2.90 
(6.31) 
-4.67 
(7.38) 
-3.64  
(6.35) 
-5.75  
(7.27) 
8.53 ** 
(3.66) 
7.62 *** 
(4.04) 
Log (Military Expenditure) 
-0.60 * 
(0.16) 
-0.62 * 
(0.22) 
-0.23 *** 
(0.14) 
-0.24 + 
(0.19) 
-0.61 * 
(0.17) 
-0.62 * 
(0.22) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Military Expenditure Squared 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-1.28E-17 
(1.18E-15) 
-1.41E-17 
(1.47E-15) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Military Expenditure * War 
Years 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-1.44 * 
(0.40) 
-1.48 * 
(0.51) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Military Expenditure * Peace 
Years 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-1.35 * 
(0.45) 
-1.36 ** 
(0.58) 
------  ------ 
Log (Military Expenditure * 
Neighbor’s Military 
Expenditure) 
------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  -0.57 * 
(0.15) 
-0.62 * 
(0.22) 
Log (Economic Development) 
0.91 *** 
(0.58) 
0.93 
(0.70) 
0.15 
(0.52) 
0.22 
(0.58) 
0.92 + 
(0.66) 
0.93 
(0.75) 
0.95 *** 
(0.60) 
0.98 + 
(0.70) 
0.79 + 
(0.55) 
0.89  
(0.67) 
Economic growth rate 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.05  
(0.04) 
0.06 + 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Log (Population) 
0.49 * 
(0.17) 
0.50 ** 
(0.24) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.16 
(0.20) 
0.49 ** 
(0.21) 
0.50 *** 
(0.27) 
0.50 * 
(0.18) 
0.52 ** 
(0.24) 
0.36 ** 
(0.15) 
0.41 ** 
(0.21) 
Democracy 
-0.05 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.05 ** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 + 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.05 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.05 ** 
(0.03) 
-0.05 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.05 ** 
(0.03) 
-0.06 * 
(0.02) 
-0.06 ** 
(0.03) 
Civil War 
-0.94 * 
(0.35) 
-0.89 ** 
(0.36) 
-0.67 ** 
(0.31) 
-0.61 ** 
(0.32) 
-0.94 * 
(0.36) 
-0.89 ** 
(0.36) 
-0.39 
(2.93) 
-0.16 
(2.84) 
-1.00 * 
(0.36) 
-1.01 * 
(0.37) 
Civil Peace Years  0.03  0.04 +  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.04 +  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03   13
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
-0.67 + 
(0.47) 
-0.68  
(0.56) 
-0.26 
(0.43) 
-0.21 
(0.48) 
-0.67 + 
(0.47) 
-0.68 
(0.56) 
-0.64 + 
(0.46) 
-0.65 
(0.56) 
-0.90 ** 
(0.46) 
-0.86 *** 
(0.53) 
 
Time Dummy 
-0.11 * 
(0.02) 
------ 
 
-0.06 * 
(0.02) 
------ 
 
-0.11 * 
(0.02) 
------ 
 
-0.11 * 
(0.02) 
------ 
 
-0.08 * 
(0.02) 
------ 
 
Dependent Variable (t-1) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.46 * 
(0.07) 
0.49 * 
(0.08) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
 
R-squared  0.549419 0.586124 0.655121 0.700211 0.549419 0.586124 0.549593  0.586412  0.551122  0.589198 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.522740 0.475323 0.631336 0.615973 0.519579 0.471159 0.519765  0.471526  0.524543  0.479219 
S.E.  of  regression  1.312297 1.375943 1.132409 1.155763 1.316635 1.381392 1.316380  1.380913  1.309814  1.370825 
Log likelihood  -268.7352 -261.8525 -235.0490 -224.1200 -268.7352 -261.8525 -268.7039  -261.7962 -268.4285  -261.2487 
F-statistic  20.59 *  5.29 *  27.54 *  8.31 *  18.41 *  5.098261  18.43 *  5.104307  20.73 *  5.357383 
Number  of  countries  06 06 06 06 06 06 06  06  06  06 
Number  of  Observations  162 162 156 156 162 162 162  162  162  162 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% confidence level; + Significant at 15% 
confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in 
parenthesis. PIR = Physical Integrity Rights Index. 
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The coefficient value further moves up to -0.62% under fixed effects method. As 
discussed earlier, in Model 3 and 4 we introduce lagged dependent variable. We find that 
the negative impact on military spending on PIR still remains at significant level. We also 
find that there is significant positive impact of lagged dependent variable on PIR, 
suggesting that there is an impact of past decisions. The interesting finding however is 
the curvi-linear effect of military spending. We find 1% significant negative effect of 
current level of military spending, while accelerating the military spending also has a 
negative effect on basic human rights (models 4 & 5; table 1). This confirms non 
existence of curvi-linear relationship between the two. In models 6 and 7 we introduced 
interactive effect of military spending during war and peace years.  
 
We find that irrespective of war of peace years, increase in military spending is 
detrimental to basic human rights. Both remain statistically significant at 1% confidence 
level. However, in both the models, the coefficient values highlights that the negative 
affect is higher during the war years to peace years by almost 0.10% in model 7 and 
0.12% in model 8. In the final models 9 and 10, we interact the military spending of X 
country with the military spending of its neighbors. This is done to see whether the 
negative effect of military spending on human rights performance is conditioned by 
increase in military spending of their neighbors. We find substantial proof for this 
argument in our results. In both Models 9 and 10, we find that this interactive variable 
has 1% significant negative impact on human rights performance. The coefficient values 
are almost equal to that of the military spending variables placed in baseline models 1 
and 2. Consistent with the findings of Vadlamannati (2008), this proves that increase in 
military spending is also triggered by neighbor’s increase in military sector growth, 
which inturn is harmful for basic human rights performance of the state.  
 
In table 2 we enter PTS as dependent variable which is rated on the scale of 1 to 5, with 1 
symbolizing respect and 5 symbolizing abuses of human rights. The 1% significant 
positive sign of military spending suggest that increase in military expenditure help 
increase human rights abuses in the form of state terrorism (see models 11 & 12; table 2). 
For the largest military spending value (17.10%) would raise PTS by 0.60% and 0.62% in 
models 11 and 12 respectively. This is around 18% of the mean value of the PTS. The 
results remain consistent in next two models 13 and 14 even after introducing lagged 
dependent variable. We also found that lagged dependent variable is a very good 
predictor of PTS. Consistent with our previous findings we could not find any curvilinear 
relationship between military spending and PTS. Rather, both military spending and its 
squared values remain positive and statistical significant.  The models 17 and 18 shows 
that increase in military spending is insensitive towards human rights abuses in both war 
and peace years. In the final models 19 and 20, we again find that the positive impact of 
military spending on PTS is conditioned by increase in military sending of its neighbors. 
These results of military sector growth confirms that using either of the dependent 
variable PIR or PTS, which is a proxy for basic human rights conditions, the results are 
similar and very much consistent. The results also remained stable irrespective of pooled 
regression method or fixed effects method.  15
Table 2: Human Rights Performance & Military Expenditure Equation Function 
 
Dependent variable: Political Terror Scale 
 
 
Variables 
Model 11 
 
Model 12 
 
Model 13 
 
Model 14 
 
Model 15 
 
Model 16 
 
Model 17 
 
Model 18 
 
Model 19 
 
Model 20 
 
 
Method 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS  
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS  
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS  
Fixed 
Effects 
Pooled 
OLS 
Fixed 
Effects 
 
Constant 
9.39 * 
(2.15) 
7.15 * 
(2.51) 
3.52 *** 
(2.12) 
3.45  
(2.38) 
6.76 * 
(2.50) 
4.56 *** 
(2.73) 
8.20 * 
(2.47) 
5.77 ** 
(2.84) 
3.01 *** 
(1.91) 
2.62  
(1.74) 
Log (Military Expenditure) 
0.34 * 
(0.07) 
0.23 ** 
(0.09) 
0.15 ** 
(0.06) 
0.12 *** 
(0.08) 
0.30 * 
(0.06) 
0.19 ** 
(0.09) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Military Expenditure Squared 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
1.50E-15 ** 
(7.10E-16) 
1.60E-15 * 
(5.89E-16) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Military Expenditure * War 
Years 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.70 * 
(0.19) 
0.43 *** 
(0.23) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Military Expenditure * Peace 
Years 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.84 * 
(0.16) 
0.59 * 
(0.21) 
------  ------ 
Log (Military Expenditure * 
Neighbor’s Military 
Expenditure) 
------  ------  ------  ------  ------ 
------ 
 
------  ------  0.31 * 
(0.06) 
0.23 * 
(0.08) 
Log (Economic Development) 
-0.47 ** 
(0.24) 
-0.18 
(0.26) 
-0.09 
(0.23) 
-0.05 
(0.25) 
-0.28 
(0.24) 
-0.0001 
(0.27) 
-0.42 *** 
(0.25) 
-0.12 
(0.27) 
-0.39 *** 
(0.23) 
-0.16 
(0.24) 
Economic growth rate 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 *** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 + 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Log (Population) 
-0.41 * 
(0.08) 
-0.30 * 
(0.09) 
-0.18 ** 
(0.07) 
-0.16 *** 
(0.09) 
-0.32 * 
(0.09) 
-0.20 ** 
(0.11) 
-0.39 * 
(0.08) 
-0.27 * 
(0.10) 
-0.34 * 
(0.06) 
-0.26 * 
(0.08) 
Democracy 
0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.005 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.01 + 
(0.00) 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
0.01 ** 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.02 ** 
(0.00) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
Civil War 
0.49 * 
(0.10) 
0.33 * 
(0.12) 
0.31 * 
(0.11) 
0.24 *** 
(0.13) 
0.52 * 
(0.11) 
0.37 * 
(0.12) 
1.34 *** 
(0.80) 
1.29 
(0.88) 
0.52 * 
(0.11) 
0.38 * 
(0.13) 
Civil Peace Years  -0.01  -0.02 **  -0.001  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02 **  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  -0.02 **   16
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
0.08 
(0.18) 
0.26  
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(0.15) 
0.05 
(0.16) 
0.19 
(0.18) 
0.38 *** 
(0.20) 
0.12 
(0.18) 
0.30 
(0.21) 
0.22 
(0.17) 
0.33 *** 
(0.18) 
Time Dummy 
0.03 * 
(0.00) 
------ 
 
0.01 *** 
(0.00) 
------ 
 
0.03 * 
(0.00) 
------ 
 
0.03 * 
(0.01) 
------ 
 
0.01  
(0.01) 
------ 
 
Dependent Variable (t-1) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.49 * 
(0.08) 
0.48 * 
(0.08) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
 
R-squared  0.511442 0.593450 0.611573 0.669611 0.525465 0.608848 0.514648  0.597202  0.512819 0.595900 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.482514 0.484610 0.584785 0.576775 0.494039 0.500195 0.482506  0.485314  0.483973 0.487715 
S.E.  of  regression  0.494993 0.493990 0.436704 0.440896 0.489450 0.486464 0.494997  0.493652  0.494295 0.492499 
Log  likelihood  -110.7868 -95.90291 -86.40495 -73.78176 -108.4278 -92.77546 -110.2535  -95.15184  -110.5581 -95.41340 
F-statistic  17.68 *  5.45 *  22.83 *  7.21 *  16.72 *  5.60 *  16.01 *  5.34 *  17.78 *  5.51 * 
Number  of  countries  06 06 06 06 06 06 06  06  06 06 
Number  of  Observations  162 162 156 156 162 162 162  162  162 162 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% confidence level; + Significant at 15% 
confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in 
parenthesis.  PTS = Political Terror Scale.  17
We see significant positive relationship between economic development and both types 
of human rights suggesting that improvement in quality of life through higher 
development process help reduce economic insecurity thereby reducing social tensions 
and unrests in the society (see table 1 & 2). However, the findings of economic growth 
rate though remain on the same lines, but are not statistically significant. We find that an 
increase in population levels exerts pressure on human rights abuses. This effect is 
significant and consistent across all forms of human rights displayed in all models. The 
results related to ethnic fractionalization are mixed. Surprisingly we find positive sign for 
PIR and negative sign for PTS (see table 1 & 2).  
 
The other most significant finding of the study is the effect of political regime on human 
rights performance in these countries. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find that 
increase in democracy levels is leading to significant decline in government respect for 
human rights in these countries. These contrary results can be attributed to various 
reasons. First, these results are found consistent to the arguments of Davenport (1994) 
who argue that the positive impact of democracy on human rights is found only after 
reaching at a threshold point. Second, usually autocratic governments frequently engage 
in imprisoning people without trial, torture, and kill citizens, while democracy ought to 
preserve from such abuses. However, in the case of India, which is world’s second largest 
democracy, it is found contrary. For example, the Amnesty report of 1999 report says the 
following about India: 
 
…….thousands of political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience, were detained 
without charge or trial. Torture and ill treatment continued to be widespread, and 
hundreds of people were reported to have died in custody. Conditions in many prisons 
amounted to cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment. “Disappearances” continued and 
hundreds of extrajudicial executions were…….  (Amnesty International, 1999)  
 
This is echoed by the findings of Beer & Mitchell (2006) who found India as an “outlier” 
in their study on 179 countries. This means this is a specific case where both democracy 
scores and human rights abuses are on higher side. It is also noteworthy that there could 
be difference in the “quality of democracy” which according to Heller, (2000), might 
significantly vary across the countries and its different set of elements have different 
impact on human rights conditions. Finally, our simple analysis of average scores of 
polity IV on these six countries during our study period shows that expect India, rest of 
them are either partially democratic or autocratic countries. The average polity IV score 
for India during the period 1980 – 2006 is 8.44, followed by Pakistan -1.15; Bangladesh 
5.15; Sri Lanka 1.31; Burma -7.33 and Nepal 0.48. This perhaps could also be another 
reason why our results show significant negative impact of political regime on human 
rights conditions in South Asia. 
 
When we introduce civil war year dummy, we find a 1% significant negative relationship 
with basic human rights. On the contrary, the number of peace years helps reduce human 
rights abuses. These results are statistically significant and consistent across the models at 
both PIR and PTS. The coefficient value for a civil war dummy is higher than peace   18
years, suggesting that the risk of civil war is always detrimental to basic human rights. 
All these results are robust as they are consistent across all the models.  
 
4. 3. Marginal Effects of Military Spending   
 
To further analyze the quantitative importance of military spending during war and peace 
years for both PIR and PTS, we calculate the marginal effects of both types of interactive 
variables using the two model specifications. We introduce the partial derivatives of PIR 
and PTS with respect to each of the interactive effect variables (with civil war and civil 
peace years) to assess the short-run effects of trade military spending dependent on the 
extent of civil war and civil peace years respectively. This is simply to test the marginal 
effect of each interactive variable on human rights performance in South Asia.  
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (3) 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (4) 
 
In cases, where the estimated parameters are not significant either at 1%; 5%; 10% levels, 
zero value is assigned to the parameter. Results of this exercise are presented in Tables 3. 
In addition to short run effects, we also calculate the long run effects by dividing the 
short run values by one minus the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.  
 
Table 3: Marginal Effects of Military Spending 
 
 
PIR 
 
PTS 
 
Variables 
 
Short run 
Effects 
 
Long run 
Effects 
 
Short run 
Effects 
 
Long run 
Effects 
 
 
Military Spending * Civil War years 
 
-0.75 % 
 
-1.40 % 
 
0.68 % 
 
1.34 % 
 
 
Military Spending * Civil Peace years 
 
-0.61 % 
 
-1.11 % 
 
0.34 % 
 
0.67 % 
 
 
The results suggests that there is a significant negative effect of both military spending in 
civil war and civil peace years, either in the short run and long run on PIR in South Asian 
countries, conversely, there is a significant positive impact of the same on PTS in both 
the short run and the long run. Military spending during civil war has a negative 
contribution of about 0.75% in short run and 1.40% in the long run on PIR. While the 
             PIR / PTS 
       =     ψ2  +  (Military Expenditure * Civil War years) it * ψ5  
Log (Military Expenditure) 
             PIR / PTS 
       =     ψ2  +  (Military Expenditure * Civil Peace years) it * ψ6 
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same during peace years has negative contribution of about 0.61% in short run and 1.11% 
in long run on PIR. A different conclusion emerges when examining the same on short 
run versus long run and war versus peace years. We find that the impact is higher in long 
run to short run. In the case of war and peace years, the impact is higher with respect to 
war years, showing that the impact of war is detrimental to human rights conditions.  
 
4. 4. Robustness Check 
 
We ran several tests of sensitivity. First, we ran all the results again by dividing the total 
sample group into two. Each set includes only three countries, India, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka in one set and Burma, Bangladesh and Nepal in second set. We do not find any 
significant changes in both the results.  We then ran the results for all six countries in 
sample but this time cutting short the study period into two halves, 1980-1993 and 1994-
2006. Despite this bifurcation, the results largely remained consistent across the board
6. 
Third, we decompose our political terror scale variable which is an average of State 
department and Amnesty international scores and ran the results for both separately. The 
results for both state department and amnesty international once again confirm that 
military sector growth lead to decrease in government respect for human rights. We also 
could not find any curvi linear effect relationship in both the models. Also the results 
about war time spending and peace time expenditure of military sector remains the same 
as found earlier. The theory of neighbor’s effect also found consistency
7.  
 
Finally, we perform sensitivity tests for our models by replacing all both PTS and PIR 
indices with freedom house scores. We compute the average of civil liberties and political 
freedom scores, which becomes our dependent variable. The results are displayed in 
annexure 3. The results show that military spending lead to decrease in government 
respect for civil and political rights. The coefficient value is remains same as we found in 
our baseline models for PIR and PTS. Holding at its mean value, increase in military 
spending by its highest value (17.10%) would decrease the government respect for 
political and civil liberties 0.59%. This result remains consistent in model 22 when we 
introduce lagged dependent variable. Also, the curvilinear effect relationship is not found 
statistically significant. This apart, both war time and peace time military spending 
effects are negative and same on human rights conditions. Finally, the results are also 
consistent with respect to condition effects of neighbor’s military spending.  We also ran 
another set of two models separately with civil liberties and political freedom scores as 
two dependent variables. We obtain identical results of both. 
 
5. Conclusion & Summary 
 
The relationship between military spending and human rights has been one of the most 
prominent issues in political economy, but the linkage seems to be empirically 
underdeveloped. This work gains prominence as it gauges the effects of military sector 
growth on human rights abuses in six South Asian economies for the period 1980 – 2006. 
The conventional wisdom posits that increase in military sector growth is detrimental to 
                                                 
6 Due to space constraints, the results are not shown here. They will be provided on request.  
7 These results are also provided on request.   20
human rights abuses. Our overall findings show that an increase in military spending, for 
military sector growth would in fact lead to a decrease in a government’s respect for 
human rights. By gauging the effect of overall military spending on human rights during 
war and peace years, we found that irrespective of the level of conflict, any increase in 
military spending is negative on human rights conditions. However, on most occasions, 
we found a higher coefficient value for negative effects of military sector growth during 
war years. Though we could not find any conclusive evidence on curvi-linear relationship 
between the two, we found that in fact acceleration of military spending would further 
deteriorate the human rights conditions in these countries. Consistent with with other 
studies, we also found that the negative impact of military spending on human rights is 
conditioned by increase in its neighbors spending. We strongly believe that given the 
range of socioeconomic and political problems ailing South Asian countries, these results 
gain paramount importance. The study suggests that a reduction in military spending 
could help reallocate the resources to productive purposes, thereby paving way for 
economic development and progress. This in turn would help reduce income inequality 
and poverty levels in South Asian that leads to civil peace due to lower social and 
economic unrest, and may increase government respect for human rights. 
 
What Next? 
 
While we have focused on one of the most contentious topics in political economy, the 
linkage between military sector growth and human rights taking the case of six South 
Asian economies, our study suggests avenues for further research on this most interesting 
topic. First, having found significant relationship between the military spending and 
human rights, the second step would be to expand on this topic, a larger sampling size of 
countries should be examined, particularly developing countries. The findings would be 
of interest to academia and policy makers. It seems inappropriate to only proxy military 
spending for overall military sector growth, which is the major drawback of our study. 
Rather, different elements related to military sector should be included, such as: armed 
forces; Research & Development (R&D hereafter) spending; arms procurement; arms 
trade and procession of large scale weapons. Another possible way could be to construct 
military sector growth index which could be unidirectional by taking into account all 
these indicators listed above. This would ensure a much more clear and comprehensive 
picture on interrelationship between the two. Future empirical work might also focus on 
gauging their impact on human rights performance by breaking up the military spending 
into recursive, capital and R&D. This would actually highlight the fact that mere (I don’t 
think “mere” works here, maybe “a small”) increase in current military spending on 
wages; salaries and other administrative purposes might not be as destructive as capital 
spending which is directly related to procurement of weapons and engaging in arms trade. 
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Annexures 
 
 
Annexure 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variables 
 
 Mean 
 
 Median 
 
 Maximum 
 
 Minimum 
 
 Standard  
Deviation 
 
 Observations 
 
 Cross  
Sections 
 
 
Military Expenditure (US $ Mn)  2707964  664454.5 24322948  22000 4467565  162  6 
 
Log (Military Expenditure)  13.51  13.41  17.1  9.99  1.81  162  6 
 
Physical Integrity Rights Index  2.35  2  7  0  1.9  162  6 
 
Political Terror Scale  3.7 3.5  5  2.5  0.69  162  6 
 
Civil Liberties Index  4.59 4  7  3  1.27  162  6 
 
Log (Percapita GDP)  7.41 7.35  8.32  6.72  0.36  162  6 
 
GDP growth rate  4.21 4.61 12.51 -12.92  3.23  162  6 
 
Log (Population)  18.13 17.98  20.83  16.51  1.34  162  6 
 
Democracy Levels  1.32 5  9  -8  6.36  162  6 
 
Civil War Dummy Years  0.64 1  1  0  0.48  162  6 
 
Number of Civil Peace Years  4.15 0  33  0  7.97  162  6 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.53 0.56  0.89  0.01  0.28  162  6 
 
British Legal Heritage  0.83  1  1  0  0.37  162  6 
 
Socialist Legal Heritage  0.17  0  1  0  0.37  162  6 
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Annexure 2: Military Spending; Arms Imports & Human Rights Conditions in South Asia 
 
 INDIA  PAKISTAN 
 
Study Period  Military  
Spending 
Arms 
Imports 
Physical 
Integrity Rights 
Military  
Spending 
Arms 
Imports 
Physical 
Integrity Rights 
 
1980 – 1984  5490165 1898.2  3.00  1844400  549.9  2.20 
 
1985 – 1994  8198800  2558.3  1.00  2850200  618  3.30 
 
1995 – 2006  15841402  1421.3  0.17  3562470  492.7  1.42 
 
Total (1980 – 2006) 
 
11093913 1941.90 
 
1.00 
 
3035759 551.58 
 
2.31 
 
 
 Sri  Lanka  Bangladesh 
 
Study Period  Military  
Spending 
Arms 
Imports 
Physical 
Integrity Rights 
Military  
Spending 
Arms 
Imports 
Physical 
Integrity Rights 
 
1980 – 1984  68682 10  4.00 199245  69  4.60 
 
1985 – 1994  428454 43.2  0.70  313263  110.1  3.80 
 
1995 – 2006  740016 67.7  2.00  624038  75.5  2.08 
 
Total (1980 – 2006) 
 
517960  41.2 
 
1.73 
 
440557  84.6 
 
3.12 
 
 
  Burma (Myanmar)   Nepal 
 
Study Period  Military  
Spending 
Arms 
Imports 
Physical 
Integrity Rights 
Military  
Spending 
Arms 
Imports 
Physical 
Integrity Rights 
 
1980 – 1984  218000 15.6  5.40  28800  0.60  5.00 
 
1985 – 1994  807315 95.6  2.10  36158  0.50  4.60 
 
1995 – 2006  1895148 120  1.25  95415  5.50  1.83 
 
Total (1980 – 2006) 
 
1219343  91.48 
 
2.19 
 
62637  2.75 
 
3.42 
 
Notes: 
1.  Military Spending is in US$ Millions average 
2.  Arms Imports are average number of weapons imported 
3.  Source for Military Spending is World Development Indicators, 2006 
4.  Source for Arms Imports is SIPRI database 
5.  Source for average Physical Integrity Rights Index is CIRI Group 
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Annexure 3: Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Human Rights Performance & Military Expenditure equation function 
 
Dependent Variable: Average of Political Freedom & Civil Liberties Indices 
  
Variables  Model 21  Model 22 
 
Model 23 
 
Model 24 
 
Model 25 
 
 
Constant 
17.05 * 
(2.91) 
4.35 * 
(1.63) 
16.06 * 
(3.46) 
17.10 * 
(3.01) 
5.95 * 
(2.14) 
Log (Military Expenditure) 
0.59 * 
(0.09) 
0.12 ** 
(0.06) 
0.57 * 
(0.09) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Military Expenditure Squared 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-5.63E-16 
(5.78E-16) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Military Expenditure * War Years 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
1.35 * 
(0.20) 
------ 
 
Military Expenditure * Peace Years 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
1.35 * 
(0.24) 
------ 
Log (Military Expenditure * 
Neighbor’s Military Expenditure) 
------  ------  ------  ------  0.48 * 
(0.09) 
Log (Economic Development) 
-0.99 * 
(0.33) 
-0.37 ** 
(0.15) 
-0.92 ** 
(0.36) 
-0.99 * 
(0.32) 
-0.74 ** 
(0.32) 
Economic growth rate 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.008 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
Log (Population) 
-0.71 * 
(0.10) 
-0.15 ** 
(0.07) 
-0.68 * 
(0.12) 
-0.72 * 
(0.10) 
-0.54 * 
(0.09) 
Democracy 
-0.11 * 
(0.01) 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.11 * 
(0.01) 
-0.11 * 
(0.01) 
-0.11 * 
(0.01) 
Civil War 
0.50 * 
(0.15) 
0.15 *** 
(0.09) 
0.52 * 
(0.16) 
0.47 
(1.02) 
0.52 * 
(0.16) 
Civil Peace Years 
0.005 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.005 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
-0.68 * 
(0.23) 
-0.08 
(0.16) 
-0.64 * 
(0.24) 
-0.68 * 
(0.23) 
-0.41 *** 
(0.23) 
Time Dummy 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.006 
(0.00) 
0.01  
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.00) 
Dependent Variable (t-1) 
------ 
 
0.88 * 
(0.05) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
 
R-squared  0.695329 0.907075 0.695910 0.695330 0.682267 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.677289 0.900666 0.675772 0.675154 0.663454 
S.E. of regression  0.720920  0.400203  0.722612  0.723301  0.736211 
Log likelihood  -171.6963  -72.78879 -171.5415 -171.6958 -175.0965 
F-statistic  38.54 *  141.54 *  34.56 *  34.46 *  36.26 * 
Number of countries  06  06  06  06  06 
Number  of  Observations  162 156 162 162 162 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis.    24
 
Annexure 4: Countries under Study 
 
Sl. No.  Countries under Study  Study Period 
 
1 Bangladesh 1980  –  2006 
 
2  Burma (Myanmar)  1980 – 2006 
 
3 India 1980  –  2006 
 
4 Nepal 1980  –  2006 
 
5 Pakistan 1980  –  2006 
 
6  Sri Lanka  1980 – 2006 
 
 
 
 
Annexure 5: Data Sources 
 
Variables 
 
Sources of Data 
 
 
Military Expenditure (US $ Mn)  World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank) 
 
Physical Integrity Rights Index  CIRI Group (http://ciri.binghamton.edu/) 
 
Political Terror Scale  Dr. Gibney (2007) http://www.unca.edu/~mgibney 
 
Civil Liberties Index  Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org) 
 
Log (Percapita GDP)  World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank) 
 
GDP growth rate  World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank) 
 
Log (Population)  World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank) 
 
Democracy Levels  Polity IV, (http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html) 
 
Civil War Dummy Years  Uppsala Dataset, 2007 
 
Number of Civil Peace Years  Uppsala Dataset, 2007 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization  Fearon, James D. & David D. Laitin (2003) 
 
Neighbors’ Military Expenditure (US $ Mn)  World Development Indicators 2006 (World Bank) 
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